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NOTES
DIFFERENTIATING LEGISLATIVE FROM
NONLEGISLATIVE RULES: AN EMPIRICAL
AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
Nadav D. Ben Zur*
The elusive distinction between legislative rules and nonlegislative rules
has frustrated courts, motivated voluminous scholarly debate, and ushered
in a flood of litigation against administrative agencies. In the absence of
U.S. Supreme Court guidance on the proper demarcating line, circuit courts
have adopted various tests to ascertain a rule’s proper classification.
This Note analyzes all 241 cases in which a circuit court has used one or
more of the enunciated tests to differentiate legislative from nonlegislative
rules. These opinions come from every one of the thirteen circuits and span
the period of the early 1950s through 2018. This Note identifies six different
tests that courts have employed in this effort and offers a qualitative and
empirical analysis of each. The qualitative analysis explains the underlying
premise of the tests, articulates their merits and shortcomings, and considers
how courts have applied them to particular disputes. The empirical portion
of this Note uses regression analysis to ascertain how using or rejecting one
or more of the tests affects a court’s determination of whether the rule is
legislative or nonlegislative.
This Note classifies the different tests into two categories: public-focused
tests and agency-focused tests. These two categories are defined by a
principle that permeates administrative law jurisprudence: achieving a
proper balance between efficient agency rulemaking and maintaining a
proper check against unconstrained agency action. These two categories
thus defined, this Note proposes a balanced approach that incorporates
elements of both categories to identify and refine the proper test.
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INTRODUCTION
Since Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA, or the
“Act”)1 in 1946, courts, scholars, and litigants have been debating how to
differentiate between legislative (e.g., notice-and-comment rules) and
nonlegislative rules (e.g., interpretive rules, general statements of policy, and
procedural rules).2 This effort has been described as the most vexing,
important, and litigated issue in the rulemaking process today.3
Under the APA, administrative agencies must comply with various
procedural requirements when issuing legislative rules,4 known as “noticeand-comment rulemaking.”5 Notice and comment is a form of public
participation that allows affected parties and individuals to submit comments,
data, and suggestions for alternative solutions with respect to problems that
agencies are considering regulating.6 These procedures, however, are both
resource-intensive and time-consuming, lasting an average of more than 460
days per promulgated rule.7
But agencies may avoid these hurdles by relying on the APA’s exemptions
for nonlegislative rules.8 The APA allows agencies to issue interpretive
rules, general statements of policy, and procedural rules without the burden
of notice-and-comment rulemaking.9 Yet, while the Act provides these
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).
2. See David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the
Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 278 (2010) (“There is perhaps no more vexing conundrum in
the field of administrative law than the problem of defining a workable distinction between
legislative and nonlegislative rules.”); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing
Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 547 (2000) (“For over
fifty years, courts and commentators have struggled to identify, and to apply, criteria that are
appropriate to distinguish between legislative rules and interpretative rules.”).
3. Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance Exemption, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 263,
265 (2018).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (“‘[R]ule’ means the whole or a part of an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect.”). Under the commonly accepted
Department of Justice definition, legislative rules are said to carry “the force and effect of
law.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947).
5. In United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the
requirements for formal rulemaking procedures. 410 U.S. 224, 241 (1973). That decision,
scholars have noted, marked the “ascendancy of the notice and comment approach for
rulemaking.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION 948 (5th ed. 2014).
6. White v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1993).
7. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U.
L. REV. 471, 513 (2011).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
9. Id.

2128

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

notable exceptions, it perplexingly fails to define them.10 The Act does not
explain the meaning of or the difference between “legislative rules,”
“interpretive rules,” “general statements of policy,” and “rules of agency
procedure.”11
The U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent foray into the field of APA
exemptions is emblematic of the Court’s muddled jurisprudence on this
issue. In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n,12 a trade organization argued
that the Department of Labor (DOL) violated the procedural requirements of
notice-and-comment rulemaking.13 Over the course of a decade, the DOL
had issued various opinion letters determining whether mortgage loan
officers qualify for an exemption from the overtime pay requirement under
the Fair Labor Standards Act.14 In 2010 the DOL abandoned its previous
positions and concluded that mortgage loan officers were not subject to the
exemption. In response, petitioners argued that the new position constituted
a legislative rule and was therefore procedurally deficient and invalid.15
During oral arguments, Justice Kagan asked the government to respond to
the growing concern that “agencies more and more are using interpretive
rules and are using guidance documents to make law and that . . . it is
essentially an end run around the notice and comment provisions.”16
In the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Sotomayor did acknowledge the
difficult task of differentiating the two types of rules and the long-standing
academic debate on the matter.17 But hopes that the Court would provide a
conclusive test were dashed when the majority held that “[w]e need not, and
do not, wade into that debate here.”18
The lack of Supreme Court guidance, coupled with the arduous process of
notice-and-comment rulemaking,19 have raised the specter, as adverted to by
Justice Kagan,20 that agencies have been labeling legislative rules as
nonlegislative in an attempt to circumvent the APA.21 As Professor Robert
Anthony remarked:

10. See id. §§ 551–559.
11. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & KRISTIN E. HICKMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.5
(6th ed. 2018).
12. 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
13. Id. at 1204–05.
14. Id. at 1204.
15. Id. at 1204–05.
16. Oral Argument at 11:27, Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) (Nos.
13–1041, 13–1052), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1041 [https://perma.cc/D6E27HLV].
17. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204.
18. Id.; see also id. at 1204–06 (holding that agencies do not have to undergo notice-andcomment procedures when altering a previous interpretive rule).
19. O’Connell, supra note 7, at 513.
20. Oral Argument, supra note 16, at 11:27.
21. See NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL AGENCY
GUIDANCE: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (2017) (explaining that “[t]he use of guidance
as a binding norm undermines the mandate of the APA that general binding policies should
be made only through the exacting procedures of legislative rulemaking”).
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If such nonlegislative actions can visit upon the public the same practical
effects as legislative actions do, but are far easier to accomplish, agency
heads . . . will be enticed into using them. Where an agency can
nonlegislatively impose standards and obligations that as a practical matter
are mandatory, it eases its work greatly in several undesirable ways.22

This Note analyzes the debate over the proper demarcating line between
legislative and nonlegislative rules both qualitatively and empirically. The
qualitative portion outlines six tests that circuit courts have considered when
determining whether a rule is legislative or nonlegislative. It reviews the
justifications for and ramifications of each test, and it offers a classification
of the tests into two categories of analysis: agency-focused tests and publicfocused tests. Constructing these binary categories facilitates useful
reflection about competing notions of administrative law jurisprudence.23
The empirical portion analyzes 241 cases from across the thirteen circuit
courts. In these opinions, courts have relied on one or more of the six tests a
total of 588 times.24 The empirical analysis in particular attempts to offer a
new contribution to this rich area of literature by measuring whether a court
employing or rejecting a certain test is more or less likely to find that a rule
is legislative.
This Note is organized as follows: Part I.A provides a brief history of key
developments in this field and highlights the legal and academic debate
around articulating and implementing a proper test to distinguish between
legislative and nonlegislative rules. Part I.B outlines the six tests circuit
courts employ in this effort and considers the tests’ merits and shortcomings
in turn. Part I.C suggests a division of the tests into binary categories of
public-focused and agency-focused tests. Then, Part II.A describes the
methodology used in this Note’s empirical analysis, and Part II.B presents
the results. Finally, Part III suggests a balanced approach consisting of
elements from both the public-focused and agency-focused categories and
proposes informed refinements for some of the tests identified.
I. LEGISLATIVE OR NONLEGISLATIVE?: THE CHALLENGE OF
ARTICULATING A TEST
The APA establishes procedural requirements for agencies to follow when
they formulate, amend, or repeal a rule.25 Compliance with the APA, as
established in the Act and in subsequent cases, requires a four-step process.26
First, the agency must issue a general notice of proposed rulemaking in the
22. Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and
the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1317
(1992). But see Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L.
REV. 65, 90, 127 (2015) (using empirical analysis to demonstrate that agencies avoid
rulemaking procedures primarily due to concerns about future litigation).
23. Infra Part I.C.
24. Data summarizing the results, as well as individual case coding for the tests relied
upon for all 241 cases, are on file with the author.
25. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
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Federal Register.27 Second, the agency must give interested parties an
opportunity to participate “through submission of written data, views, or
arguments.”28 Third, as the Second Circuit instructed in United States v.
Nova Scotia Food Products Corp.,29 relevant submissions must be given due
Lastly, when
consideration and may require specific treatment.30
promulgating a final rule, the agency must include a concise general
statement of the rule’s basis and purpose.31
Agencies may avoid these requirements by relying on the APA’s
exceptions for interpretive rules, general statements of policy, and rules of
agency procedure.32 These exceptions, as courts have noted, are both key to
efficient agency operation and compatible with the purposes of the APA.33
As the Sixth Circuit explained, the three exceptions “reflect[] the idea that
public input will not help an agency make the legal determination of what
the law already is.”34 They also facilitate important agency work by
providing “a degree of flexibility where ‘substantive rights are not at
stake.’”35
But as Perez noted, the terms are “not further defined by the APA, and
[their] precise meaning is the source of much scholarly and judicial
debate.”36 A 1947 Department of Justice manual (the “Manual”) provided
an early guide to the APA’s definitional void and proved influential with
courts.37 The Manual defines legislative rules as rules “other than
organizational or procedural . . . issued by an agency pursuant to statutory
authority and which implement the statute” and “have the force and effect of
law.”38 The Manual defines interpretive rules as rules “issued . . . to advise
the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it
administers.”39 Finally, the Manual defines general statements of policy as
“statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the
manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.”40
27. Id. § 553(b) (“The notice should include (1) a statement of the time, place, and nature
of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is
proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved.”).
28. Id. § 553(c).
29. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
30. Id. at 251 (detailing proper agency consideration of submitted data).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
32. Id. § 553(b)(A).
33. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that
the function of the exemption for general policy statements is to allow agencies to announce
their future intentions without binding themselves).
34. Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 680 (6th Cir. 2005).
35. Sentara-Hampton Gen. Hosp. v. Sullivan, 980 F.2d 749, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting
Bowen, 834 F.2d at 1045).
36. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015).
37. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4. As Justice Antonin Scalia noted, the Court has
“repeatedly given great weight” to the Manual in its decisions on the issue. Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
38. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 30 n.3.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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But these definitions, as commentators have noted, are of modest utility,41
and the challenge of finding a line between legislative and nonlegislative
rules persists to this day.42
A. The APA: Procedural Requirements and Evolving Doctrine
Congress implemented the APA as a response to growing concerns about
administrative overreach during the New Deal.43 As the Supreme Court
noted shortly after the Act’s implementation: “The [APA] was framed
against a background of rapid expansion of the administrative process as a
check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to
excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices.”44 And, as
Judge Richard A. Posner noted, in passing the Act, Congress reached a
“historic compromise.”45 The APA was, on the one hand, an acceptance of
the administrative state as an organ of federal lawmaking and, on the other,
a significant check on administrative functions through various procedural
constraints.46
Chief among these constraints is the notice-and-comment rulemaking
structure. By mandating this procedure, Congress pursued several goals:
(1) “to reintroduce public participation and fairness to affected parties”;47
(2) to assure “that the agency will have before it the facts and information
relevant to a particular administrative problem”;48 and (3) to facilitate a
process through which agencies engage in “due deliberation” before
implementing regulations with the force and effect of law.49
Courts have also maintained that the process is a necessary check on
agency power. “The APA notice and comment procedures exist for good
reason: to ensure that unelected administrators, who are not directly
accountable to the populace, are forced to justify their quasi-legislative
rulemaking before an informed and skeptical public.”50

41. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules
and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 533 (1977).
42. See generally Pierce, supra note 2.
43. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 5, at 937 (“[W]ith the enormous expansion of
executive branch and independent agencies during the New Deal, some private sector
observers voiced increasing alarm about the bureaucracy’s authority and influence over the
actions of individuals and entities.”).
44. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950).
45. Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
953, 954 (1997).
46. See Richard A. Epstein, The Role of Guidances in Modern Administrative Procedure:
The Case for De Novo Review, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 52–53 (2016) (explaining that “[t]he
APA is best understood as the consolidation and rationalization of the administrative state, not
as its repudiation”).
47. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
48. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Guardian
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir.
1978)).
49. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996).
50. New Jersey v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 670 F.2d 1262, 1281 (3d Cir. 1981).
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A celebrated opinion by Judge Posner articulated these justifications. In
Hoctor v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,51 the Seventh Circuit had to
determine whether a Department of Agriculture rule—mandating a minimum
fence requirement when constructing cages for wild animals—was
legislative or interpretive. In holding that the rule was legislative, and that it
therefore had to undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking, Judge Posner
wrote:
There are thousands of animal dealers, and some unknown fraction of these
face the prospect of having to tear down their existing fences and build new,
higher ones at great cost. The concerns of these dealers are legitimate
and . . . the agency was obliged to listen to them before settling on a final
rule.52

The following sections review the common distinction between legislative
and nonlegislative rules, the D.C. Circuit’s influential decision that shaped
the modern debate over the issue, and the Supreme Court’s most recent
discussion of legislative and nonlegislative rules.
1. The Common Distinction: The Rule’s Legal Effect
While the debate continues, scholars and courts seem to have reached a
consensus on one fundamental distinction between legislative and
nonlegislative rules: the former have a binding effect while the latter do
As Michael Asimow explains, the prevailing standard for
not.53
distinguishing legislative from interpretive rules is the “‘legal effect’ test.”54
If a rule makes new law, instead of interpreting existing law, then that rule is
legislative.55 Similarly, and pre-dating the APA, the Supreme Court
announced in Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. United States56 that
regulations altering the affected public’s behavior “have the force of law.”57
While that makes some intuitive sense, this distinction is difficult to apply
and often produces inconsistent results.58 As Professor Mark Seidenfeld
argues, beyond the consensus that nonlegislative rules lack a binding legal
force, ambiguity as to what legal force means and how it can be measured

51. 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996).
52. Id. at 171.
53. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979) (“It has been
established . . . that properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the ‘force and
effect of law.’”); Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d
658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that a legislative rule has “the force of law”); see also
PIERCE & HICKMAN, supra note 11, § 4.3.
54. Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J.
381, 394.
55. Id.
56. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
57. Id. at 418.
58. Franklin, supra note 2, at 288.
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“has confused the courts.”59 Indeed, courts have often admitted that the
distinction is “fuzzy,” “baffling,” and “enshrouded in considerable smog.”60
2. American Mining Congress
In the D.C. Circuit’s influential American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety
& Health Administration61 decision, the appellate court articulated its task as
determining whether a rule has “the force of law.”62 The case concerned a
DOL interpretation of a statute mandating that mine operators report certain
diagnoses of occupational illnesses.63 The Department issued several “policy
letters” stating that certain x-ray results constitute a diagnosis and therefore
must be reported.64 Replying to the petitioners’ challenge, the DOL
defended its actions by arguing that the policy letters were interpretive rules
exempt from notice-and-comment procedures.65
To resolve the challenge, the court introduced three lines of inquiry:
(1) What is the agency label? Did the agency note that the rule is
nonlegislative, or did it announce the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) or go through notice and comment?66 (2) Has the agency created new
rights or duties for the regulated public?67 Did the challenged rule alter the
regulatory landscape such that parties must abide by a new statutory
standard?68 (3) Was the agency clarifying or supplying an ambiguous statute
with greater detail?69 An agency, after all, may provide new definitions to a
statute and still remain within the domain of nonlegislative rules.70
Though American Mining Congress stands as perhaps the most influential
articulation of the distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules,71
scholars have debated its merits. Professor Richard Pierce argued that
American Mining Congress is a sound opinion that provides a revealing
test.72 He noted that, if widely adopted, the tests it outlined would
59. Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance
Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 335 (2011).
60. Pierce, supra note 2, at 547–48 (first quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d
1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987); then quoting Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946
(D.C. Cir. 1987); and then quoting Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975)).
61. 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
62. Id. at 1109 (quoting Nat’l Latino Media Coal. v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785, 787–88 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)).
63. Id. at 1107.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1108.
66. Id. at 1109.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1109–10 (explaining that if a new rule is “irreconcilable” with an old legislative
rule, the new rule is legislative).
69. Id. at 1110 (explaining that if a new rule explains a preexisting duty, the new rule is
interpretive).
70. See infra Part I.A.3.
71. See Pierce, supra note 2, at 561 (noting that the American Mining Congress opinion
is widely praised in casebooks and treatises and “was also followed both within the circuit and
by other circuits”).
72. Id. at 548, 560–61.
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significantly help to remediate the “the rampant confusion and
inconsistency” that pervades this area of administrative law.73
But Professor Richard Manning disagreed and argued that, far from being
the ultimate test, American Mining Congress makes it “difficult, at best, to
draw meaningful distinctions between interpretive and legislative rules.”74
In sum, Manning warned that the D.C. Circuit’s approach to identifying
legislative rules “may necessitate reliance on little more than an I-know-itwhen-I-see-it test.”75
3. The Current Landscape: Perez
Though the Supreme Court has at times referred to the task of
differentiating legislative from nonlegislative rules,76 it has avoided tackling
the distinction directly and has instead left the circuit courts in their current
disarray. In Perez, the Court persisted in its avoidance and announced that it
would not wade into the debate over the line between legislative and
nonlegislative rules.77 Still, the majority and concurring opinions provided
some insightful commentary on the issue.
The respondents raised three arguments pertaining to the APA and its
nonlegislative rules exceptions: (1) text, (2) precedent, and (3) policy
considerations.78 Helpfully, Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion replied to
each, shedding important light on the Court’s interpretation of the APA.79
First, the respondents argued that when an agency significantly changes a
prior interpretation, it amends that regulation and must undergo notice-andcomment procedures.80 But the Court disagreed.81 It distinguished
“amending” from “interpreting” and held that agencies may freely engage in
acts of interpretation even when that produces new understandings of the
underlying statute.82 The majority reasoned that just as courts do not amend
a statute when they interpret its text, so too can agencies interpret a regulation
without effectively amending the underlying law.83 Justice Thomas
concurred, stating that “[a]n agency’s substantial revision of its interpretation
of a regulation does not amount to an ‘amendment’ of the regulation as that
word is used in the [APA].”84

73. Id. at 548.
74. John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 922 (2004).
75. See, e.g., id. at 927.
76. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 88 (1995); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281, 314 (1979).
77. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015).
78. Consolidated Brief of Respondent at 21, 23–25, 28–29, Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) (Nos. 13-1041, 13-1052).
79. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1207.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1207–08 (comparing Black’s Law Dictionary definitions of “amend” and
“interpret”).
83. Id. at 1208.
84. Id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Perez therefore appears to expand the realm of interpretive rules by
allowing agencies to offer a new understanding of a statute, even when that
new understanding sets forth new rights or duties.85 The Court emphasized
that the respondents’ argument conflicts with the “longstanding recognition”
that interpretive rules cannot change the regulation they interpret because
interpretive rules do not have the force and effect of law.86
Second, the respondents pointed to Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial
Hospital,87 in which the Court stated that when agencies adopt new positions
inconsistent with existing regulations, they must comply with notice-andcomment procedures.88 But Justice Sotomayor dismissed that portion of the
opinion as “dictum” and cautioned that Guernsey Memorial Hospital’s
reasoning only applies when the amendment refers to rules originally
promulgated as legislative.89
Finally, the respondents warned that policy considerations militate against
permitting an amendment through an interpretive rule.90 They contended
that overruling Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P.91 would
further entrench the practice of issuing nonlegislative rules to skirt the APA
and unexpectedly alter important regulations.92 But the Court rejected that
argument and highlighted that the APA contains other constraints on agency
procedures, such as the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review.93
Accordingly, the Court held that petitioners cannot rely on newly erected
additions to notice-and-comment rulemaking.94
In his concurrence, Justice Antonin Scalia took issue with the majority’s
construction of Congress’s intent in framing the exemptions to the APA.95
“This concession,” referring to the APA’s exemption of interpretive rules,
“was meant to be more modest in its effects than it is today.”96 Lamenting
the Court’s administrative law jurisprudence, Justice Scalia criticized the
Court’s approach to the issue and, specifically, its reading of the APA’s
contemplation of the proper role for the courts. Namely, while the Act holds
85. Id. at 1207–08 (majority opinion). But Perez could also be read more narrowly given
that the case involved an amendment to an interpretive rule. Id. at 1205. Unfortunately, the
Court was less than careful in its terminology. For example, it held that an agency can interpret
a “regulation” without effectively amending the underlying source of law. Id. at 1208. It is
unclear, however, whether by “regulation” the Court was referring to an interpretive rule, a
legislative rule, or both. See id.
86. Id.
87. 514 U.S. 87 (1995); see also Consolidated Brief of Respondent, supra note 78, at 26.
88. See Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. at 100.
89. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1209.
90. Consolidated Brief of Respondent, supra note 78, at 30 (arguing that limitations on
amending interpretive rules “prevent fickle agency flip-flopping on established positions”).
91. 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir 1997), abrogated by Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S.
Ct. 1199 (2015).
92. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1209.
93. Id. (explaining that the APA allows courts to find that an agency action is arbitrary
and capricious and therefore in violation of the Act).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring).
96. Id.
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that courts, rather than agencies, will resolve statutory ambiguities, the
Supreme Court has allowed agencies to authoritatively resolve ambiguities
in statutes.97
Consequently, Justice Scalia explained, agencies now use interpretive
rules to bind the public in one of two ways. First, as a result of Auer v.
Robbins,98 any interpretive rule that meets certain conditions—such as
reasonableness—is “every bit as binding as a substantive rule.”99 Second,
because agencies are cognizant of the expanding domain of interpretive rules,
they “need only write substantive rules more broadly and vaguely, leaving
plenty of gaps to be filled later, using interpretive rules unchecked by notice
and comment.”100 These developments, the concurrence concluded, shifted
the original balance the APA struck with respect to interpretive rules.101
B. The Six Tests
From the early “substantial impact” test102 to the variety of tests articulated
in American Mining Congress,103 six different inquiries have defined the
judicial approach to differentiating legislative from nonlegislative rules. This
section outlines the tests as they appear in case law and highlights the
scholarly debate surrounding each.
In short, the six tests are: (1) the “agency label” test, which relies on the
agency’s own characterization of the rule—as legislative or nonlegislative—
as a guide to the rule’s proper classification; (2) the “clarification” test, which
asks whether a rule merely provides greater clarity to an existing regulation;
(3) the “acting pursuant to statutory delegation” test, which assesses whether
the agency has the required authority from Congress to implement legislative
rules; (4) the “agency binding” test, under which a rule is more likely to be
deemed legislative if it has effectively limited an agency administrator’s
discretion; (5) the “create new rights or duties” test, which assesses whether
an agency has shifted the regulatory landscape by creating new rights or
duties for the affected public; and (6) the “substantial impact” test, under
which a rule with a significant impact on the regulated public will more
readily be found to require notice-and-comment procedures.

97. Id.
98. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
99. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 461
(holding that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation). As this Note is being prepared for publication,
the Supreme Court is set to hear oral arguments on the question of whether the Court should
overturn Auer. See Kisor v. Wilkie, No. 18-15 (U.S. cert. granted Dec. 10, 2018).
100. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring).
101. Id.
102. Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 703 (5th Cir. 1979).
103. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109–12 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
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1. Agency Label
The “agency label” test looks to the agency’s own classification of the rule
in dispute.104 This, in turn, introduces a rebuttable presumption that a rule is
nonlegislative if an agency describes it as such, or if the agency forgoes
publication in the CFR or the Federal Register.105
This approach is rooted in one of the key tenets of administrative law:
courts should afford a “presumption of procedural validity” to an
administrator’s decisions.106 As it pertains to ascertaining a rule’s true
nature, relying on the agency label is an acknowledgement that the agency is
the authority best suited to explain why it issued a rule and why it chose to
implement it in a specific manner.107
Indeed, courts across the circuits often defer to the label an agency casts
on its disputed rule and afford it significant weight. The Second Circuit, for
example, noted that “[a]n agency’s characterization of a rule is the ‘starting
point’ for an analysis of its status as legislative or interpretive.”108 Taking
this proposition to its extreme, the Seventh Circuit held: “[Petitioner] starts
from a disadvantage, because . . . we give great weight to an agency’s
expressed intent.”109 And when the Sixth Circuit decided that a Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) letter was a general statement of
policy, it noted that the most persuasive factor for its holding was the
agency’s description of the letter as mere guidance.110
Other courts, however, afford little or no weight to the agency’s label.
Some courts have remarked that an agency’s own label is relevant but not
dipositive111 and that it is the court’s role to look beyond the agency’s
characterization.112 As the Fifth Circuit stated, courts should be “mindful
but suspicious of the agency’s own characterization” of a promulgated
rule.113
Perhaps most forcefully, one judge argued that relying on this test is an illadvised exercise in deference to the agency’s views. In American Hospital

104. See, e.g., Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 859 F.3d 1072, 1077
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“There are three relevant factors to whether an agency action constitutes
substantive rulemaking under the APA: (1) the Agency’s own characterization of the
action . . . .”).
105. See United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding that a regulation was nonlegislative because it “was not published in either the Code
of Federal Regulations or the Federal Register, providing further evidence that the regulation
was not intended to be binding”).
106. Levin, supra note 3, at 290.
107. Id.
108. Mejia-Ruiz v. INS, 51 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Metro. Sch. Dist. v.
Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1992)).
109. First Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Standard Bank & Tr., 172 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 1999).
110. Dyer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 1989).
111. See, e.g., Mt. Diablo Hosp. Dist. v. Bowen, 860 F.2d 951, 956 (9th Cir. 1988).
112. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 176 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
113. Id. at 171.
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Ass’n v. Bowen,114 a majority of a D.C. Circuit panel determined that a rule
was nonlegislative after noting that “[t]he real dividing line” between
legislative and nonlegislative rules is whether the agency published the rule
in the CFR.115 In dissent, Judge Abner Mikva found this reasoning
unpersuasive: “Obviously, an agency that contends its rule is not substantive
is unlikely to publish that rule in the CFR. This fact, however, adds nothing
to the underlying contention. If the agency’s action is in reality a substantive
rule, it is no less so for remaining unpublished.”116
2. Clarification
The “clarification” test offers a seemingly obvious inquiry into whether a
rule is legislative or interpretive. Interpretive rules, as the name suggests,
seek to clarify statutes and rules117 and do not “effectuate[ ] [a] change in
policy or law.”118 Stated differently, interpretative rules reflect what the
agency’s administrators think a statute or regulation means.119
Scholars have noted that this test is the most prominent test courts use to
differentiate interpretive from legislative rules.120 The case law posits
several articulations of this test.121 These include inquiring whether a rule
“reminds” parties of their rights and duties or provides an explanation of the
law that is “fairly encompassed” within the regulation that the agency is
purporting to elucidate.122
But some have raised concerns regarding the clarification test’s
explanatory power. When a majority of a panel of the Third Circuit applied
the clarification test and held that an agency’s rule was interpretive,123 Judge
Richard Nygaard forcefully dissented: “The majority seems to imply that,
because the two letters clarify and explain the already-existing [statutes],
they are interpretive. But this reasoning proves too much. Indeed, it is
difficult to conceive of any nonprocedural regulation that does not in some
way explain or clarify an existing federal statute.”124
Nevertheless, the clarification test retains its prominent status in the case
law,125 and courts often expand the realm of “clarifications” to include
114. 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
115. Id. at 1056.
116. Id. at 1060 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
117. Brasch v. United States, 41 F. App’x 574, 576 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Guardian Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 664–65 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(“[A]n interpretative rule is merely a clarification or explanation of an existing statute or
rule.”).
118. Allen v. Bergland, 661 F.2d 1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 1981).
119. Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
120. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 73–77 (5th ed.
2012).
121. Levin, supra note 3, at 324 (citing Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir.
2009); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. FAA, 291 F.3d 49, 55–56 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
122. Id.
123. Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir. 1995).
124. Id. at 187 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
125. See infra Part II.B.4.
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additional policy implications.126 Most notably, in American Mining
Congress the D.C. Circuit held that an interpretation of a statute can include
a new and more detailed understanding of a regulation because interpretive
rules must be able to “suppl[y] crisper and more detailed lines than the
authority being interpreted.”127 Holding to the contrary, the court warned,
would entail that “no rule could pass as an interpretation of a legislative rule
unless it were confined to parroting the rule or replacing the original
vagueness with another.”128
3. Pursuant to Statutory Delegation
Often presented as a threshold test, courts consider whether Congress has
delegated agencies the power to issue legislative rules and, if so, whether
agencies relied on that delegation.129 The premise of this test is that an
agency that lacks legislative power, or an agency that fails to exercise
delegated legislative power to promulgate a specific rule, necessarily issues
only interpretive rules.130
Nevertheless, as some courts note, this inquiry may often be of limited
value.131 Because agencies have the power to issue interpretive rules, and
because many agencies also have delegated legislative rulemaking
authority,132 inquiring whether the agency acted pursuant to statutory
delegation often fails to illuminate whether the rule is legislative or
nonlegislative.133
The Ninth Circuit, for example, noted the test’s limited value when
deciding whether a Forest Service memo was a legislative rule: “[T]he Forest
Service had the authority to promulgate both legislative and interpretative
rules concerning surpluses.”134 And because the Service did not indicate on
which authority it was relying, the court had to look “for other indications”
of the agency’s intent.135
126. See Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987). Judge
Frank Easterbrook explained that though an amendment contained new language, the agency’s
action helpfully eliminated ambiguity: “Far better to eliminate than to perpetuate confusion.”
Id.; see also Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613–14 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that “penalizing
the agency for explaining” a regulation “would be like killing the messenger”).
127. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
128. Id.
129. See Children’s Hosp. of the King’s Daughters, Inc. v. Azar, 896 F.3d 615, 622 (4th
Cir. 2018) (“When an agency relies on expressly delegated authority to establish policy . . .
courts generally treat the agency action as legislative, rather than interpretive, rulemaking.”).
130. W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502, 1504 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of reh’g en banc,
819 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir. 1979)
(“[A]lways, the question is whether Congress intended to confer upon the agency the power
to issue rules having the force and effect of law.”).
131. Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1992).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., id. (finding that the pursuant to statutory delegation test “returns us to the
starting point . . . what kind of rule does the agency think it has promulgated?”).
134. La.-Pac. Corp. v. Block, 694 F.2d 1205, 1209–10 (9th Cir. 1982).
135. Id. at 1210.
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Still, some courts often use this test as an indication of a legislative rule
when the congressional delegation leaves a regulatory gap for an agency to
fill.136 As the Fourth Circuit explained, when Congress leaves a gap in the
statutory scheme, it can expressly delegate legislative authority to the
agency.137 Then, the agency’s elucidation of that gap through rule
promulgation will be a legislative rule.138 Applying this distinction, the
Eighth Circuit found that a rule was interpretive because the agency “was not
filling in gaps in a statute which granted the agency broad discretion to carry
out policy.”139
4. Agency Binding
Particularly when determining whether an agency action is a general
statement of policy or a legislative rule, courts inquire whether the agency
has restricted its own administrators when executing their administrative
duties. As the Eleventh Circuit explained, “The key inquiry . . . is the extent
to which the challenged policy leaves the agency free to exercise its
discretion to follow or not to follow that general policy in an individual
case.”140
Under the “agency binding” test, an agency action that allows
administrators to exercise flexibility when making individualized
determinations is a general statement of policy.141 But when an agency
action limits administrative discretion or establishes a binding norm, it
effectively creates a new legislative rule.142 Such actions are legislative, and
they therefore must undergo notice-and-comment procedures.143 The
Eleventh Circuit explained that the agency binding test is useful because it
encapsulates the key considerations of notice and comment:
The significance of this factor is that it reveals whether, if objections to the
rule cannot be voiced through notice and comment rulemaking . . . there
will be a subsequent opportunity to object to a specific application of the
rule. If an agency, or its official, is bound to apply an airtight rule in a given
case it is important to allow specific objections prior to promulgation, lest
these objections be forfeited.144

136. See, e.g., Coal. for Common Sense in Gov’t Procurement v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs,
464 F.3d 1306, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
137. Walton v. Greenbrier Ford, Inc., 370 F.3d 446, 452 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)).
138. Id.
139. McKenzie v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1216, 1222 (8th Cir. 1986).
140. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 1983).
141. Sacora v. Thomas, 628 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2010).
142. Id.
143. See W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502, 1505 (9th Cir.) (“Rules which substantially limit
an agency’s discretion are generally substantive rules.”), amended on denial of reh’g en banc,
819 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1987).
144. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1481–82 (11th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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But some courts and commentators have expressed concern about the
agency binding test.145 The Federal Circuit, for example, cautioned that an
agency limiting its administrators’ discretion does not make its actions
legislative.146 Instead, the court must look at whether that limitation
adversely affects individual rights and obligations.147 Administrative law
scholars have also remarked that because the APA does not require notice
and comment for issuances binding lower-level agency officials, courts
should not mandate such a process.148 Most forcefully, Richard Pierce
warned, “With luck, the Supreme Court will have occasion to reject th[is]
doctrine unequivocally before it begins to have [a] devastating effect.”149
5. Create New Rights or Duties
The test for whether a rule creates new rights or duties, in its various
formulations, has been the dominant test in this corner of administrative
law.150 Its origin is rooted in the common distinction between nonlegislative
and legislative rules, in which the latter, unlike the former, have the force and
effect of law.151 In articulating this test, courts have noted that legislative
rules “grant rights, impose obligations, or produce other significant effects
on private interests.”152
This status can often be gleaned from surveying the regulatory landscape
before and after the challenged rule. If a rule creates rights or imposes
obligations “not already outlined in the law itself,” the rule is legislative.153
As the D.C. Circuit remarked, this formulation is another way of ascertaining
“whether the disputed rule really adds content to the governing legal
norms.”154
For example, the Third Circuit deemed a Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) rule nonlegislative because it did not “impose new duties
upon regulated parties.”155 In contrast, the Second Circuit held that a

145. See Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 82–83 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that a rule may
bind agency personnel and still remain nonlegislative for purposes of notice and comment).
146. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 929 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
147. Id.
148. Brief of Administrative Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16–
17, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674) [hereinafter Brief of
Administrative Law Scholars].
149. Id. at 17 (alterations in original) (quoting 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 17.3 (5th ed. 2010)).
150. See infra Part II.B.4.
151. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4.
152. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701–02 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Gray v. Sec’y
of Veterans Affairs, 875 F.3d 1102, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he ultimate focus of the inquiry
is whether the agency action partakes of the fundamental characteristic of a regulation, i.e.,
that it has the force of law.” (quoting Molycorp Inc. v. EPA, 197 F.3d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir.
1999)), cert. granted, Gray v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 451 (2018).
153. La Casa del Convaleciente v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 1175, 1177–78 (1st Cir. 1992).
154. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
155. SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 501 (3d Cir. 2005).
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purported Department of Labor general statement of policy was a legislative
rule, in part because it “changed existing rights and obligations.”156
But other reviewing courts considering this test have argued for a more
limited approach. The Ninth Circuit, for example, explained that even
though regulations may have altered administrative duties or created
hardships, that fact alone does not make them legislative rules.157 Under this
construction of the test, and given the expanding domain of interpretive
rules,158 it is becoming increasingly difficult to ascertain whether an
interpretive rule that altered rights and duties crosses the line into the territory
of a legislative rule.
6. Substantial Impact
Under the “substantial impact” test, agency actions that significantly
impact the regulated parties are more likely to constitute a legislative rule
and should undergo notice-and-comment procedures. This test has proven
controversial, with some circuits lauding its value and others forcefully
rejecting it.159
The Second,160 Third,161 Fourth,162 and Fifth163 Circuits have considered
this test relevant. Most prominently, the Fifth Circuit held that the test in
determining whether a rule is legislative is the extent to which a rule
substantially impacts the regulated parties.164 If a new agency policy
substantially impacts the regulated public, “the new policy is a new
substantive rule and the agency is obliged, under the APA, to submit the
change for notice and comment.”165 Conversely, where an agency can
demonstrate that its actions did not have a considerable impact on regulated
parties, that may suggest that the agency properly relied on the notice-andcomment exemptions.166

156. Lewis-Mota v. Sec’y of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972).
157. Chief Probation Officers v. Shalala, 118 F.3d 1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1997). The court
explained that this argument goes into the substantial impact test and is not dispositive. Id.
158. See supra Part I.A.3.
159. The Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have not weighed in on the
substantial impact test. The First Circuit cautioned that the test is relevant but not dispositive.
See Caribbean Produce Exch., Inc. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 893 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir.
1989).
160. Time Warner Cable Inc. v. FCC, 729 F.3d 137, 168 (2d Cir. 2013).
161. Chao v. Rothermel, 327 F.3d 223, 227–28 (3d Cir. 2003).
162. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1981).
163. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
164. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994), modified on
denial of reh’g en banc, No. 93-1377, 1994 WL 484506 (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 1994).
165. Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 630 (5th Cir. 2001).
166. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153–54 (5th Cir. 1984)
(finding that the Department of Labor’s guidelines were not legislative because they “cast[]
not the stone of substantial impact”).
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The Sixth,167 Seventh,168 and Ninth169 Circuits have expressly rejected the
substantial impact test and have enumerated its shortcomings. A Sixth
Circuit case illustrates some of these shortfalls. In Friedrich v. Secretary of
Health & Human Services,170 a Medicare recipient sued the Secretary of
HHS for exempting a critical medical procedure from Medicare coverage.171
Under Part B of the Medicare Act, the Secretary must deny reimbursement
for services not “reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment” of
a claimant’s illness or injury.172 Acting accordingly, HHS issued a manual
stating that the required treatment was neither necessary nor reasonable and
determined it would no longer be covered under Medicare Part B.173
Friedrich alleged that the Secretary’s manual was a legislative rule and was
procedurally invalid because it had not undergone notice and comment.174
Though HHS countered that the manual was interpretive, the magistrate
judge relied on the substantial impact test and held that HHS failed to comply
with the APA procedures for legislative rules.175
The circuit court disagreed and explained why it was improper to use the
substantial impact test to distinguish between legislative and interpretive
rules:
The plaintiff also contends that the [manual] should be considered
legislative or substantive because it has a substantial impact on a large
number of Medicare beneficiaries. . . . Any determination by the
Secretary . . . will have a substantial impact on a large number of people.
The extent of the impact is not an indicative factor in our search for the
proper characterization of the [manual].176

Because the Secretary interpreted the meaning of “reasonable and necessary”
in the Medicare Act, the court reasoned that the substantial impact test would
not only fail to shed light on a rule’s “true” nature, but it would also point to
the wrong conclusion.177 Accordingly, it reversed the lower court and held
that the manual was an interpretive rule, exempt from notice and comment.178

167. Friedrich v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 894 F.2d 829, 836 (6th Cir. 1990)
(holding that “the level of impact on interested parties is not a factor in correctly classifying a
rule or regulation”).
168. Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 493 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that
“[p]revailing authority rejects the proposition that a rule that has substantial impact is
necessarily legislative”).
169. Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 1983).
170. 894 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1990).
171. Id. at 831–32.
172. Id. at 830 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)).
173. Id. at 831–32.
174. Id. at 832.
175. Id. at 832–33.
176. Id. at 836.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 838.
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Finally, the D.C. Circuit stands alone among its sister circuits in rejecting
the substantial impact test for interpretive rules179 but applying it for
procedural rules.180 This distinction produces a somewhat puzzling
inconsistency, exacerbated by the harsh critique some panels in the D.C.
Circuit have resorted to when describing the test. In Cabais v. Egger,181 the
court explained that, after Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,182 it is clear that courts may not impose
procedural requirements on agencies beyond those contemplated by the
APA.183 The court added that “[t]he words ‘substantial impact’ do not appear
in the APA” and that the test is considered a “judicial gloss.”184
But in the context of procedural rules, panels of the D.C. Circuit have noted
the test’s explanatory power and have distinguished between procedural and
legislative rules based on the substantial impact test.185 Applying the test to
a rule under dispute, one court found that the rule was legislative because it
“substantively affect[ed] the public to a degree sufficient to implicate the
policy interests animating notice-and-comment rulemaking.”186
C. Public-Focused and Agency-Focused Tests
The six tests so defined, it is analytically insightful and useful to classify
them into two categories: (1) agency-focused tests and (2) public-focused
tests.
1. Categorizing the Tests
The agency label, clarification, pursuant to statutory delegation, and
agency binding tests are agency-focused. These tests are typified by a legal
analysis that focuses on the agency’s action or inaction rather than a rule’s
effect on the public. In contrast, the create new rights or duties test and
substantial impact test are public-focused. These tests emphasize the adverse
effect on the regulated public and disregard the agency’s justification for
choosing certain regulatory measures.

179. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he
impact of a rule has no bearing on whether it is legislative or interpretative; interpretative rules
may have a substantial impact on the rights of individuals.”).
180. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 211–12 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(“[I]t is apparent that the Directive cannot be considered procedural. The Directive is intended
to, and no doubt will, affect the safety practices of thousands of employers.”).
181. 690 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
182. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
183. Cabais, 690 F.2d at 237 (citing Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524).
184. Id. at 237 n.3. Still, the court noted that while the test may never constitute an
independent basis for a determination, it could be “one of several criteria” in determining
whether a rule should be exempt from the APA. Id.
185. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
186. Id. at 6. But see Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 276 F.3d 634, 640 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(noting that the D.C. Circuit has gradually shifted away from the substantial impact test).
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This binary classification is informed by the underlying premise of each
test. In brief, the agency label test187 analyzes the agency’s actions, namely
the label it has attached to a rule188 and where and whether the rule was
published.189 The clarification test,190 while turning on a textual analysis,
assesses whether the agency acted reasonably within the confines of the
regulation it is claiming to interpret.191 The pursuant to statutory delegation
test192 focuses on the agency’s mandate from Congress and considers
whether the agency acted accordingly.193 The agency binding test194
analyzes the agency’s own administrators and considers whether they are free
to exercise discretion in future cases.195
In contrast, the public-focused tests determine whether, and to what extent,
the public has been affected by a disputed rule. The create new rights or
duties test196 determines whether individuals bound by the agency’s
pronouncement must comply with new rules or restrictions.197 The
substantial impact test198 identifies the relevant affected party and measures
the rule’s impact on that party.199 While these tests necessarily consider the
agency’s action, their primary concern is the regulated public.
The academic literature provides additional support for the binary
classification.200 Some scholars emphasize the adverse effect on the
regulated public.201 Perhaps most famously, Professor Robert Anthony
explained that while nonlegislative rules do not purport to bind the public,
187. See supra Part I.B.1.
188. See First Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Standard Bank & Tr., 172 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 1999)
(“[W]e give great weight to an agency’s expressed intent as to whether a rule clarifies existing
law or substantively changes the law.”).
189. See United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“[T]he [regulation] was not published in either the Code of Federal Regulations or the Federal
Register, providing further evidence that the regulation was not intended to be binding.”).
190. See supra Part I.B.2.
191. See, e.g., United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 946 (9th Cir. 2007).
192. See supra Part I.B.3.
193. See, e.g., Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006).
194. See supra Part I.B.4.
195. See, e.g., Sacora v. Thomas, 628 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2010); Ryder Truck Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 1983).
196. See supra Part I.B.5.
197. Compare Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a rule was nonlegislative because “the Commission’s position
did not constitute a substantive rule having the force and effect of law”), with Xin-Chang
Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 746 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a rule was legislative because
it “create[d] a new basis on which” the affected public must rely and “change[d] an existing
policy”).
198. See supra Part I.B.6.
199. See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
200. See Seidenfeld, supra note 59, at 332 (comparing the works of Robert Anthony and
Peter L. Strauss); see also Anthony, supra note 22, at 1372 (concluding that numerous policy
documents bind the public and therefore should be issued as legislative rules); Peter L. Strauss,
Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential
Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 807 (2001) (criticizing the D.C. Circuit for unduly restricting
agency use of guidance documents).
201. See Seidenfeld, supra note 59, at 345–52.
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“often an agency will make use of such rules with the purpose or effect of
imposing a practical norm, if not a legally binding one, upon the regulated
or benefitted public.”202
These public-focused tests are motivated by a fear of untoward agency
actions. “People rightly resent being surprised by new interpretations that
the government suddenly pulls out of its nonlegislative hip pocket . . . . We
should consider erecting some protections to forestall use of the kinds of
interpretations that affect the public most harshly.”203
But other scholars frame their concerns differently and, perhaps as a result,
reach different conclusions. As Professor Seidenfeld notes, scholars fearing
the consequences of the public-focused analysis argue that such tests exert
an undue burden on agency operation.204 Responding to Anthony’s
arguments, Professor Donald Elliott, a former general counsel for the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), warned: “If the courts were to
follow Anthony . . . the modern administrative process would literally grind
to a halt.”205 Illustrating this proposition, Professor Thomas McGarity notes
that “the fact that the air and waters of the United States are still polluted,
workplaces still dangerous, motor vehicles still unsafe, and consumers still
being deceived is attributable to the expense and burdensomeness of the
informal rulemaking process.”206 In sum, these scholars highlight concerns
about inefficient rulemaking procedures and the perils of halting agency
action.
This binary classification is, of course, oversimplifying both the case law
and academic literature. Some of these tests do not lend themselves to a clear
dichotomy. The clarification test, for example, takes many forms, and courts
who employ it may explicitly or implicitly refer to the alleged clarification
as a benefit to the public.207 Additionally, while scholars on both sides of
the debate highlight different concerns, they do not discredit the contrary
position.208 Instead, they differ in shaping and achieving the proper balance
between agency efficiency and public participation.
These shortcomings notwithstanding, this analysis is qualitatively and
empirically useful because the tests grouped in the two categories share

202. Robert A. Anthony, “Well, You Want the Permit, Don’t You?” Agency Efforts to
Make Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 32 (1992) (second
emphasis added) (arguing that the proper test is inquiring whether agencies intended to, and
effectively did, bind the public).
203. Id. at 39.
204. See Seidenfeld, supra note 59, at 352.
205. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1494 (1992).
206. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1391 (1992).
207. See, e.g., Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987).
While the court focuses on the agency’s motivations in issuing an interpretive rule, it also
highlights the benefits to the public: “[The previous rule] produced confusion inside and
outside the Department, confusion that the [interpretive rule] eliminates. Far better to
eliminate than to perpetuate confusion.” Id.
208. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 206, at 1403 (“[I]t is generally a good idea for agencies
to analyze carefully the consequences of proposed rules on the public and on regulatees . . . .”).
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common themes that permeate the literature and jurisprudence. Empirically,
categorizing the tests into binary categories provides insights that these tests,
individually considered, could not support.209
2. Locating the Dividing Line: A Hypothesis
This Note hypothesizes that courts relying on agency-focused tests will be
more likely to find that a rule is nonlegislative and, conversely, that courts
relying on public-focused tests will be more likely to hold that a rule is
legislative. This hypothesis is rooted in the different considerations that
define the scholarship. Scholars such as McGarity and Elliot,210 for example,
focus on considerations of efficient rulemaking procedures, presumptions of
procedural validity, and the benefits of nonlegislative rules.211 These are all
encompassed in the agency-focused analysis and thus appear to more readily
support a conclusion that the agency acted permissibly.
In contrast, the public-focused approach, most notably promoted by
Professor Anthony, brings to the forefront the concerns and frustrations of a
regulated public that has been afflicted with new obligations via an
unchallengeable and private proceeding.212 The create new rights or duties
test and substantial impact test are particularly apt to capture such
considerations. Stated differently, the hypothesis is that courts emphasizing
the burdens on different parties—agencies or the public—will reach different
results.
Before turning to the empirical analysis, it is important to highlight one
analytical drawback that this hypothesis introduces. Namely, because there
is no uniform test, courts may choose to employ a certain test to support their
predetermined conclusion and avoid tests that would point in the opposite
direction. Testing the hypothesis therefore may not reveal the explanatory
power of the two approaches, but instead may merely demonstrate that courts
reference the tests most suitable to their conclusion.
The concern that courts will cherry-pick factor tests that best fit their
predetermined conclusion was notably articulated by Justice Scalia.213 He
argued that judges will chose a test that will produce an outcome “favored by
the[ir] personal (and necessarily shifting) philosophical dispositions.”214 In
the matter of differentiating legislative from nonlegislative rules, the concern
is even greater given the lack of a standard test between the circuits and even
within a single circuit.215
209. Some of the tests appear less frequently in the case law and therefore do not provide
meaningful inferences from a statistical-analysis standpoint.
210. See Elliott, supra note 205, at 1491–94; McGarity, supra note 206, at 1397–99.
211. Elliott, supra note 205, at 1491–96.
212. See generally Anthony, supra note 22.
213. See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 747, 754 (2017).
214. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 96 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 795 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing
that a multifactor test is more confusing than revealing).
215. See supra Part I.B.6.
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Accordingly, the meaningful difference between the public-focused and
agency-focused tests can be explained not by the tests’ power to shed light
on the dispute, but instead by the courts’ predilection to adopt the analysis
that best suits the panel’s preconceived notions. Nevertheless, this analysis
can provide meaningful insights and allows for a simple distinction between
the tests.
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The focus of this empirical analysis is measuring the effect of using each
of the six tests when a court is determining whether a rule is legislative or
nonlegislative. Specifically, this Note seeks to ascertain whether, by
employing any of the six tests, a court is more or less likely to find that a rule
is legislative. Finally, this Part presents its findings by separating the tests
into the two identifiable categories of agency-focused tests and publicfocused tests discussed in Part I.C.
The empirical study covers 241 cases from across the thirteen circuits. The
earliest case is from 1952 and the latest is from 2018. The vast majority of
the cases were decided after the Court’s seminal decision in Vermont
Yankee.216 Each of the tests appeared in nearly every circuit. In 205 cases,
a court used more than one test. Overall, the tests appeared a total of 588
times across all 241 opinions.
This analysis is organized as follows: Part II.A outlines the empirical
study’s methodology. It details how each test is classified and how the
database is structured. Part II.B presents the results from the study of the 241
cases, Parts II.B.1 through II.B.3 detail patterns in the case law across circuits
and over time, and Part II.B.4 provides a detailed analysis of the use or
rejection of each test. Finally, Part II.B.5 revisits this Note’s hypothesis that
using public-focused tests increases the likelihood of a finding that a rule is
legislative.
A. Methodology
The following explains which cases comprise the dataset and how they
were chosen, and then details how the tests were identified and coded.
1. Finding Cases
The 241 cases in the dataset were mostly located by the following Boolean
searches on Westlaw: “‘legislative rule’ OR ‘substantive rule’ & APA OR
‘Administrative Procedure Act’”; “‘interpretive rule’ OR ‘interpretative rule’
& APA OR ‘Administrative Procedure Act’”; “‘general statement of policy’
OR ‘policy statement’ & APA OR ‘Administrative Procedure Act’”;
“‘procedural rule’ OR ‘rule of agency procedure’ & APA OR
‘Administrative Procedure Act’”.
216. 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (holding that courts may not add additional procedural
requirements not already outlined in the APA).
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A minority of the cases did not appear in these searches. Instead, they
were discovered in one of three ways: first, by referring to cases cited in
court opinions that were found using the Westlaw searches; second, by using
the Westlaw headnotes feature to find cases citing other opinions; and third,
by referring to cases cited in scholarly articles.
In the vast majority of the cases in the database, a petitioner is challenging
an agency for circumventing the notice-and-comment procedures by
improperly relying on the APA’s exemptions.217 In a few cases, petitioners
actually tried to remove themselves from a rule’s coverage by claiming that
a rule is nonlegislative.218 This difference is meaningful given the
presumptions about how agencies and plaintiffs frame their arguments.
Nevertheless, because a court’s analysis is effectively the same in both types
of cases, they are both considered.
Finally, cases in the database meet two conditions. First, these cases were
decided on the merits. Challenges resolved on issues such as standing or
mootness were not coded. Second, the court’s opinion included some, even
minimal, analysis of the reasons for determining whether a rule is legislative
or nonlegislative.
Decisions that affirm or deny a lower court’s
determination without an explanation were not coded into the study.
2. Reciting Precedent or Applying a Test?
The empirical analysis determines the impact of a court using a particular
test to find whether or not a rule is legislative. This invites the question of
what constitutes “using” a test. This Note only examines cases that expressly
rely on one of the six tests.219 Such reliance is manifested by courts’
application of one or more of the tests to the facts of a particular dispute
rather than a mere recitation of a precedent or administrative law principle.220
3. Identifying the Tests
Determining when a court uses a test is fairly simple in three instances.
First, opinions often refer to the tests by the terminology this Note employs.
217. See, e.g., Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[Plaintiff] filed
the present action under the [APA] seeking to enjoin the Secretary of Labor . . . from enforcing
[a regulation] without the Secretary first engaging in notice and comment rulemaking.”);
Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1133 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[Petitioners] argue that the
Ashcroft Directive is not a valid agency rule—and thus is not entitled to deference—[because]
the Attorney General did not promulgate the Ashcroft Directive pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures . . . .”), aff’d sub nom. Gonzales
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
218. See, e.g., United States v. Lott, 750 F.3d 214, 217 (2d Cir. 2014). Lott, a convicted
sex offender, argued that the sentencing guidelines used in his trial were interpretive rules.
Accordingly, he alleged that the Attorney General improperly relied upon the guidelines as a
rule with the force and effect of law. Id.
219. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005) (identifying the usage of canons of
construction by assessing courts’ express reliance on them).
220. See, e.g., Dia Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding
that “the INS policies at issue in this case constitute rules for purposes of the APA”).
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Examples include: “[the change had] a substantial impact on the motor
carrier industry”;221 the Secretary “did not create rights or change existing
law”;222 and “we find that the agency did not intend to exercise its delegated
law-making power.”223
Second, some opinions employ a synonym or an equivalent term for the
tests. For example, when the Fourth Circuit referred to the “pursuant to
statutory delegation” test, it noted: “the Bureau of Prisons has exercised the
discretion given to it by Congress.”224 Similarly, when the Tenth Circuit
used an equivalent of the create new rights or duties test, it noted that the
“interpretation did not create or alter a legal obligation.”225
The third instance includes opinions with language that is not an equivalent
of this Note’s terminology but refers to substantially the same underlying
principle. For example, while the Second Circuit did not explicitly use the
terminology “agency label” in Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery,226 it observed
that “[t]he January 1990 interim rule is self-described as interpretive.”227
Each instance of these three categories was coded as using the defined test.
The more challenging task in this analysis, however, is classifying opinions
that use more obscure language. The guiding principle of the methodology
can be summarized as one of erring on the side of caution. Therefore,
opinions that seem to suggest that the court is relying on a particular test, but
are too vague to draw a clear conclusion, were not included in the dataset.
Context also guides the analysis. If a circuit has previously endorsed or
rejected a certain test, these past decisions informed the determination.
For example, in Malone v. Bureau of Indian Affairs,228 the Ninth Circuit
held that a memo characterized by the agency as an interpretive rule was
instead a legislative rule.229 The court noted that the memo “conclusively
affect[s] the rights” of individuals like the petitioner.230 A plausible reading
of this language would indicate that the court is relying on the substantial
impact test. However, the court does not mention the test, and the word
“conclusively” could encompass meanings other than substantial and its
synonyms. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has elsewhere rejected the
substantial impact test in the context of interpretive rules.231 Therefore, the
analysis does not code Malone as relying on the substantial impact test.

221. Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying the
substantial impact test).
222. McKenzie v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1216, 1222 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying the create new
rights or duties test).
223. La Casa del Convaleciente v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 1175, 1179 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying
the pursuant to statutory delegation test).
224. Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir. 1999).
225. Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006).
226. 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995).
227. Id. at 745–46.
228. 38 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 1994).
229. Id. at 438–39.
230. Id. at 438 (quoting Linoz v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 1986)).
231. Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 1983).
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B. Results and Discussion
The study includes 241 cases from the thirteen circuit courts. The earliest
case is from 1952232 and the latest is from July 23, 2018.233 In 205 cases,
courts used more than one test in their analysis. Overall, courts mentioned
one of the six tests 588 times.
In total, circuit courts found that a rule is legislative in 66 out of 241 cases
in the database, or in 27.4 percent of challenges to agency rules. In the
remaining 175 cases, courts held that the rules were either interpretive rules,
general statements of policy, or rules of agency procedure.
Table 1: Total Holdings: Legislative or Nonlegislative (N = 241)

Nonlegislative
Legislative

Cases
175
66

Percentage (%)
72.6
27.4

1. Challenges to Nonlegislative Rules over Time
Two patterns appear when charting the total number of cases over five
distinct time periods and the total number of cases in which a rule was held
legislative.
Chart 1: Number of Cases over Time and Percentage of Cases in Which
Courts Determined a Rule Is Legislative (N = 241)234

232. Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
233. Children’s Hosp. of the King’s Daughters, Inc. v. Azar, 896 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 2018).
234. The dark bars represent the total number of cases in the time period. The lighter bars
represent the number of cases in which a court held that a rule was legislative. The percentages
represent the ratio of the number of findings that a rule was legislative to the number of cases
within the time period. Thus, for example, in the decade between 1978 and 1988, there are
sixty-three cases in the study. Courts found that a rule was legislative in twenty-three of the
cases, or 37 percent.
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First, the total number of cases on this issue peaked between 1988 and
1998 and has declined gradually in the two decades since. Second, the
percentage of courts holding that a rule is legislative peaked before 1988,
declined in the period from 1998 to 2008, but has been trending upward in
the past decade.
Several factors may help explain these patterns. First, success on the
merits may have invited more legal challenges. Given that over a third of the
challenges to nonlegislative rules were successful before 1988, observant
litigants were likely more eager to challenge an agency’s failure to engage in
notice and comment. Conversely, the diminished success of these challenges
in the subsequent decade might have dissuaded similarly situated litigants.
Second, developments in administrative rulemaking and the perception of
agency work may have affected overall patterns. From the significant
expansion of agency actions during the 1970s,235 a more exacting standard
of judicial review under the APA of agency decision-making emerged in the
late 1970s and 1980s.236 This trend could have encouraged litigants to
challenge agencies in front of more discerning panels.
Third, the Court’s decisions in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.237 and United States v. Mead Corp.238 may have also
contributed to the continued decline of challenges in the past two decades.239
As Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell explained,240 one possible outcome of
Mead is that agencies may now prefer the more laborious notice-andcomment rulemaking process to issuing informal guidance.241 Because rules
promulgated through notice-and-comment procedures will likely receive
Chevron deference, agencies may be more willing to employ such
procedures.242
Finally, the higher ratio of success in the past decade may also be
influenced by the concern that some politicians243 and commentators244 have
expressed regarding the “administrative state.” This renewed attention to and
concern about unbridled agency action could have motivated a more
skeptical judicial review of agency action. Based on past trends, the next

235. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 5, at 896 (explaining that “United States agencies in the
1970s showed unprecedented interest in rulemaking rather than adjudication”).
236. Id. at 897–98.
237. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
238. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
239. Note, however, that the sample size is limited and does not account for challenges that
ended at the district court level. Accordingly, conclusions from the data should be carefully
drawn.
240. O’Connell, supra note 7, at 522.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Susan E. Dudley, Trump Wants to Deconstruct the Administrative State. Can He?,
NBC NEWS (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-wantsdeconstruct-administrative-state-can-he-ncna810576 [https://perma.cc/9KZL-HVGV].
244. Chuck DeVore, The Administrative State Is Under Assault and That’s a Good Thing,
FORBES (Nov. 27, 2017, 1:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckdevore/2017/11/27/theadministrative-state-is-under-assault-and-thats-a-good-thing/ [https://perma.cc/8PBS-PKBF].
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decade could see a similar increase in the number of challenges to agencies
invoking nonlegislative exemptions.
2. Circuit Court Holdings
Table 2: Rules Held to Be Legislative by Circuit (N = 241)
Circuit

First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
D.C.
Federal

Total Number of Cases
6
16
16
17
13
15
9
6
44
9
6
68
16

Held Legislative (%)
2 (33.3)
5 (31.3)
4 (25.0)
5 (29.4)
6 (46.2)
3 (20.0)
1 (11.1)
2 (33.3)
10 (22.7)
0 (0.00)
1 (16.7)
23 (33.8)
4 (25.0)

Because circuits other than the Ninth and the D.C. Circuit have decided
relatively few cases, it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions or patterns
from circuit court holdings. Indeed, a regression analysis indicates that only
the Tenth Circuit offers statistically significant data.
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Table 3: Regression Analysis: Differentiating Rules by Circuit
(N = 241)245
Circuit

First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth**
Eleventh
D.C.*
Federal

Held Legislative
-.09 (.18)
-.06 (.12)
-.11 (.12)
-.05 (.12)
.01 (.13)
-.14 (.12)
-.09 (.15)
-.01 (.18)
-.13 (.08)
-.35 (.15)
-.13 (.18)
.18 (.09)
-.10 (.12)

As Table 3 demonstrates, few meaningful inferences can be drawn by
testing a specific circuit’s likelihood of finding that a rule is legislative. On
the one hand, this lack of significance is perhaps attributable to courts’
inability to fashion a cohesive test and the field’s changing consensus on the
proper tests to be employed. On the other hand, and perhaps more
encouragingly, this could also indicate that courts are indeed conducting a
neutral case-by-case analysis, and therefore their rulings are unrelated to the
court’s predisposition to side with or against an agency.
A notable exception, however, is the Tenth Circuit, which the analysis
indicates is 35 percent more likely to side with an agency and hold that a rule
is nonlegislative. Although this result is statistically significant, the Tenth
Circuit only heard nine cases on the issue and therefore had fewer
opportunities to reach a different result.
3. Number of Tests Considered
In the 241 cases, the tests were invoked 588 times. In Table 4, the leftmost
column represents the number of tests an opinion expressly relied upon.
Thus, in 34 cases, the court relied on only 1 test; in 109 cases, the court relied
on 2 tests; and so on. The “Held Legislative” column represents the number
245. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses next
to coefficients. The base category for comparison is no effect, (-1) represents a finding that a
rule is nonlegislative, and (+1) represents that a rule is legislative. This Note follows the
traditional social-science approach to regression results, where a p value of .05 or less
indicates a statistically significant result. See RAND WILCOX, MODERN STATISTICS FOR THE
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 147 (2d ed. 2017).
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of times a court held that a rule was legislative rather than nonlegislative.
Therefore, from the 34 cases in which the court relied on one test, it found
the rule was legislative in eight of the cases.
Table 4: Number of Tests Relied Upon (N = 588)
Number of Tests Used
1
2
3
4
5
6

Cases
34
109
60
30
7
1

Held Legislative (%)
8 (23.5)
28 (25.9)
18 (30)
12 (40)
0 (0)
0 (0)

Increasing the number of tests considered in a given case does not have a
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of finding that a rule is
legislative.
Table 5: Statistical Significance of Number of Tests Relied Upon (N = 588)
Number of tests considered

Held Legislative
.01 (.03)

The regression in Table 5 measures the impact of increasing the number
of tests considered—from one to six—on a court’s likelihood of finding that
a rule is legislative. Increasing the number of tests considered in a given case
does not have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of finding that
a rule is legislative. This is perhaps rooted in three reasons. First, courts may
dismiss “weaker” challenges where the panel decides a rule is nonlegislative,
and therefore the panel does not need to engage in a lengthy discussion that
differentiates legislative from nonlegislative rules.246 Conversely, courts
perhaps provide a more detailed analysis, including multiple tests, to better
justify why an agency action is permissible under the APA in challenges that
appear more meritorious. Finally, it is also possible that considering more
tests increases the suspicion that an agency acted impermissibly. As it relates
to the public-focused and agency-focused analysis, perhaps courts
considering tests from both approaches are able to better scrutinize an

246. For example, the Sixth Circuit held that a rule is interpretive in a brief paragraph:
An interpretive rule is one “issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s
construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.” We agree with the
district court that [the rule] “advises the public of the DOI’s construction of [the
statute]” . . . and hence that notice and comment were not required.
United States v. Century Offshore Mgmt. Corp. (In re Century Offshore Mgmt. Corp.), 111
F.3d 443, 453 (6th Cir. 1997) (first quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87,
99 (1995)).
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agency’s action. In sum, however, increasing the number of tests considered
has no bearing on the likely success of a challenge to an agency rule.
4. The Six Tests
This Note seeks to determine whether using any one of the six tests affects
the likelihood that a court will find that a rule is legislative. The following
discussion details the patterns the study found about the six tests.
Table 6: Overall Frequency for Each Test in the Database (N = 241)
Test
Agency Label
Clarification
Pursuant to Statutory Delegation
Agency Binding
Create New Rights or Duties
Substantial Impact

Cases
86
151
62
65
184
40

% Used
35.68
62.66
25.73
26.97
76.35
16.60

From 1952 until 2018, the most prominent test in the case law has been the
create new rights or duties test, which appears in 184 out of 241 cases. Also
appearing in over half of the cases is the clarification test. Charting and
plotting test usage throughout the years demonstrates some of the trends in
the analysis.
Graph 1: Test Appearance over Time247

Graph 1 demonstrates developments and trends in the case law over time.
First, the create new rights or duties test and clarification test are persistently
the most prominent tests. Second, the pursuant to statutory authority test
247. AL = Agency Label; CL = Clarification; PSD = Pursuant to Statutory Delegation;
AB = Agency Binding; CNR = Create New Rights or Duties; SI = Substantial Impact.
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increased in appearance in the decade between 1988 and 1998. This is
perhaps explained by the Supreme Court’s 1984 holding in Chevron, which
focused on congressional delegation to an agency as the first step of its
analysis.248 Third, the substantial impact test has been steadily decreasing in
appearance since the early 1980s.
Tables 7 and 8 below represent the key findings of this Note: the effects
of using one of the six tests in a court’s determination of whether a rule is
legislative or nonlegislative.
These tables represent the results of the following regression analysis. The
independent variable is the test considered. The base category for
comparison is no effect. Table 7 is a simple regression model with the test
considered as an independent variable, and whether the rule was held as
legislative (+1) or nonlegislative (-1) as the dependent variable.249 Thus, for
example, a court using the agency label test is 10 percent less likely to find
that a rule is legislative or, conversely, 10 percent more likely to find that a
rule is nonlegislative. Table 8 introduces two additional control variables to
the regression: circuit court and time period.250
Table 7: Simple Model: Tests Considered and Finding that an Agency
Rule is Legislative (N = 241)
Test
Agency Label*
Clarification***
Pursuant to Statutory Delegation
Agency Binding
Create New Rights or Duties***
Substantial Impact**

Simple Model
-.10 (.06)
-.19 (.06)
.03 (.12)
.05 (.06)
.27 (.06)
.16 (.07)

Table 8: Control Model: Tests Considered and Finding that an Agency
Rule is Legislative (N = 241)
Test
Agency Label**
Clarification***
Pursuant to Statutory Delegation
Agency Binding
Create New Rights or Duties***
Substantial Impact

Control Model
-.13 (.06)
-.18 (.06)
.04 (.07)
.02 (.07)
.27 (.09)
.11 (.08)

248. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
249. The dependent variable is binary, with (-1) representing a finding that a rule is
nonlegislative and (+1) representing a finding that a rule is legislative.
250. The circuit court variable includes the thirteen circuits. The time periods are defined
as pre-1978, 1978–1988, 1988–1998, 1998–2008, 2008–2018.
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Part II.B.4.a through Part II.B.4.f below analyze the study’s results for
each of the tests.
a. Agency Label
The agency label test is statistically significant when introducing the
circuit court and time period control variables and falls slightly short of the
statistically significant threshold in the simple regression model.
Relying on Table 8, a court using the agency label test will be 13 percent
more likely to find that a rule is nonlegislative and that the agency action is
permissible. This result is perhaps explained by the premise that some courts
have outlined when relying on this test: there is a presumption of procedural
validity when the court reviews an agency action.251 Thus construed, the
agency label test appears to encapsulate a limited role for the court in
checking agency action. This presumption, which has been increasingly
reiterated by the Supreme Court, perhaps also explains why controlling for
time periods in Table 8 increases the significance of the agency label test.
Connor Raso’s analysis of the court’s role in administrative law is
insightful here.252 Technically, three entities may punish agencies for
procedurally defective process: the president, Congress, and the courts.253
As Raso notes, however, the first two entities rarely take up that mantle,254
and courts are left as the sole barrier between the agency’s will and the
affected public.
Given that role, judges who explicitly acknowledge that an agency has
labeled a rule nonlegislative and then proceed to hold that a rule is legislative,
find themselves in the position of having to tell an agency: “you are lying.”
Meaning, if the court holds that a rule is legislative even though the agency
labeled it as nonlegislative, the court is in fact holding that the agency has
misled the president and Congress and has attempted, unsuccessfully, to
mislead the court.
Indeed, any determination that the agency failed to follow notice-andcomment procedures carries such implications. But when judges recite in
detail the agency’s actions, such as an administrator’s pronouncement that a
rule is nonlegislative, they make their disagreements more pronounced and
place the court in a seemingly more activist position.
In sum, the results in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that considering the agency
label increases the likelihood that the court will agree with the agency and
hold that the rule did not violate the notice-and-comment provisions of the
APA. This is explained both by the presumption of procedural validity that

251. See, e.g., United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir.
2000).
252. Raso, supra note 22, at 90.
253. Id. at 80.
254. Recently, however, the Trump administration appears to be challenging that
proposition. See Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, Att’y Gen., on Prohibition on
Improper Guidance Documents 1 (Nov. 16, 2017).
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courts confer on agencies and by courts’ unwillingness to check an agency
and hold that it has attempted to deceive the courts.
b. Clarification
In both regression models, the clarification test is statistically significant
and increases the likelihood of a finding that a rule is legislative by 19 percent
and 18 percent, according to Table 7 and Table 8 respectively.
This result appears to support the concern that Judge Nygaard expressed255
when rejecting his colleagues’ use of the clarification test—nearly all
regulations in some way explain or clarify an existing rule.256 Accordingly,
and under an expansive definition of the clarification test,257 agencies may
always successfully contend that a rule is interpretive and does not violate
the APA.258 This definition also finds support in American Mining Congress,
which emphasized that a rule may be interpretive even if it “supplies crisper
and more detailed lines” than an existing rule.259
A recent decision that relies on Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n
illustrates the implications of broadly construing the clarification test. In
Ass’n of Flight Attendants v. Huerta,260 a flight attendants’ union sued the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for violating the APA. For decades,
the FAA had recommended that passengers be allowed to use electronic
devices during the main portion of the flight261 but not during takeoff and
landing.262 In 2013, however, the FAA issued a notice informing its safety
inspectors that the agency need not approve an airline’s finding that
passengers may use personal electronic devices during all parts of the
flight.263 Soon after, the flight attendants’ union sued the agency for
improperly promulgating a legislative rule.264 At the core of the union’s
argument was that the 2013 notice amended a prior regulation and therefore
should not be considered an interpretive rule.265
The D.C. Circuit disagreed.266 The court explained that agencies may
freely issue interpretations that do not amend the underlying regulations they
interpret.267 As applied to the union’s challenge, the guidance documents
255. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
256. Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 187 (3d Cir. 1995)
(Nygaard, J., dissenting).
257. See supra Part I.A.3.
258. See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text.
259. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
260. 785 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
261. Id. at 714. This was the FAA’s interpretation of 14 C.F.R. § 121.306(b)(5), which
recommended that airlines permit use of any device so long as the device does not interfere
with aircraft systems. Id. at 713–14.
262. Id. at 714.
263. Id. at 715.
264. Id.
265. See id.
266. Id. at 717–19.
267. Id. at 713.

2160

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

may have created new recommendations that aviation safety inspectors could
follow, but they did not create new law that amended a previous
regulation.268 The court relied on the arguments set forth in Perez, which
explained the difference between amending and interpreting a rule.269 Under
this framework, it is likely that a new interpretation of a regulation, which
produces different effects on the regulated public, would be sustained as an
interpretive rule and therefore exempt from notice and comment.
In sum, the expansive definition of an interpretive rule, which American
Mining Congress established270 and Perez overwhelmingly endorsed,271
allows agencies to successfully argue that a new interpretation clarifies a
regulation and is therefore permissible. If the two decisions are taken to their
logical extremes, it is, as Judge Nygaard warned, difficult to conceive of any
interpretation that would not be sustained under the clarification test.272
Further, if interpretive rules are construed as beneficial agency actions that
serve the regulated public, courts may be more willing to accept an agency
rule that modifies an existing regulation so long as the agency couches it as
an interpretive rule and finds shelter under the umbrella of the APA’s
exemptions.
c. Pursuant to Statutory Delegation
In both regression models, the pursuant to statutory delegation test is not
statistically significant.
This result supports the Seventh Circuit’s
characterization of the test as lacking in explanatory power: “[this test]
returns us to the starting point . . . what kind of rule does the agency think it
has promulgated?”273 Stated differently, because most agencies have the
delegated power to issue both legislative and nonlegislative rules, the test
reveals little about the true nature of an agency’s challenged action.274 Given
the test’s seeming tendency to confirm a decision rather than aid in its
formulation, the cases below demonstrate how courts have referred to the test
and have arrived at different conclusions.
On the one hand, some courts find specific legislative authority to support
an inference that an agency issued legislative rules. In Sweet v. Sheahan,275
for example, the Second Circuit held that an EPA rule regulating lead paint
was legislative, in part because it was “promulgated pursuant to the explicit
statutory authority of the Lead-Based Paint Act.”276 Likewise, the D.C.
Circuit explained that the DOL “enjoys delegated authority to prescribe rules
268. Id. at 718.
269. Id. at 713 (quoting Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1208 (2015)).
270. Am. Mining Cong. v. Health & Safety Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109–12 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
271. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206–09 (2015).
272. Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 187 (3d Cir. 1995)
(Nygaard, J., dissenting).
273. Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1992).
274. See, e.g., La.-Pac. Corp. v. Block, 694 F.2d 1205, 1209–10 (9th Cir. 1982).
275. 235 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2000).
276. Id. at 92.
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with the force of law”277 and, regarding the specific issue in the case, that it
was “authorized to promulgate legislative rules governing unemployment
statistics.”278 Accordingly, the court held that the DOL’s action “cannot be
merely an interpretative rule.”279
On the other hand, courts have relied on an agency’s lack of authority to
regulate specific matters to hold that a rule is nonlegislative. The Eleventh
Circuit held that a DOL rule was interpretive because the congressional
delegation only allowed the DOL to issue interpretive rules.280 In another
challenge to the DOL, the First Circuit held that the agency action constituted
an interpretive rule in part because it was within the Secretary’s authority to
formulate rules in administering the statute.281 Thus, the pursuant to
statutory delegation test does not appear to influence a court’s finding in
either direction. Instead, it seems to serve as an added justification for a
decision reached on other merits.
d. Agency Binding
The agency binding test is not statistically significant under either
regression model, and the empirical analysis does not point to any
determinative impact that follows from considering this test. This is
surprising given that commentators have cautioned that using the agency
binding test will have several deleterious effects.282
This result is perhaps explained by the limited number of occasions in
which courts have considered this test,283 nearly always in the context of
general statements of policy. But perhaps the reason is more fundamental.
Weighing this test typically entails questioning whether the agency bound
itself to reach a particular result in adjudication or enforcement actions: an
elusive distinction to draw.
For example, in National Ass’n of Broadcasters v. F.C.C.,284 the D.C.
Circuit held that an FCC directive was not a legislative rule because it did
not force the Commission to reach a particular result in any case.285 But the
same circuit rejected a similar argument a few years earlier. In General
Electric Co. v. EPA,286 the court held that a guidance document was a
legislative rule even though the EPA had maintained that the document did
not force the agency to reach a particular result in any case.287 Instead, the

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 706.
Id.
Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1338 (11th Cir. 2009).
Nason v. Kennebec Cty. CETA, 646 F.2d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 1981).
Brief of Administrative Law Scholars, supra note 149, at 16–17.
See supra Part II.B.3.
569 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 426.
290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 384–85.
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court determined that the agency “will not be open to considering approaches
other than those prescribed in the Document.”288
As the two cases demonstrate, whether a certain document is binding on
an agency is a difficult line to draw and appears to support an “I-call-it-whenI-see-it” type of reasoning. That, in addition to the theoretical shortfalls that
litigants289 and the First Circuit and Federal Circuit articulated,290 lend
support to the criticism of this test.
e. Create New Rights or Duties
In both regression models, the create new rights or duties test is statistically
significant; using the test increases the likelihood of finding that a rule is
legislative by 27 percent. This impact, combined with the frequency with
which the test appears in opinions, renders it the most critical test in the
legislative versus nonlegislative rules debate.
The dominance of the create new rights or duties test is perhaps explained
by its ability to “catch” different instances in which the agency, by mistake
or design, binds members of the public and alters the regulatory landscape.
A rigid construction of this distinction, as in the case of Xin-Chang Zhang v.
Slattery below, results in a more forceful limitation on an agency’s power to
issue nonlegislative rules.291
In Xin-Chang Zhang, the Second Circuit determined that a self-proclaimed
interpretive rule by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was
legislative and failed to comply with the APA.292 Until 1990, the INS had
held that China’s “one couple, one child” rule was not, alone, a sufficient
basis for granting asylum.293 But that year the agency issued an interim
rule—described as interpretive—stating that refugee status may be conferred
on the sole basis of an applicant’s objection to China’s “one child” policy.294
That change, the Second Circuit held, “create[d] a new basis on which aliens
may be granted refugee status; it change[d] an existing policy.”295
Accordingly, the court concluded that the interim rule was legislative.296
This holding flowed from the court’s description of the proper way to
distinguish legislative from nonlegislative rules: “In distinguishing between
the two types of rules, the central question is essentially whether an
agency . . . create[d] new law, rights, or duties.”297
This result is particularly striking considering that the Fourth Circuit,
analyzing the same rule but using a different test, reached a different
288. Id. at 384.
289. See supra note 148.
290. Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 82–83 (1st Cir. 1998); Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 929 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
291. 55 F.3d 732, 745–47 (2d Cir. 1995).
292. Id. at 747.
293. Id. at 739.
294. Id. at 745–46.
295. Id. at 746.
296. Id. at 747.
297. Id. at 745.
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conclusion. In Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll,298 the petitioner argued that in
considering his asylum request, the INS failed to follow the interim rule and
therefore improperly denied his request.299 Unlike in Xin-Chang Zhang,
however, the Chen Zhou Chai court considered whether the rule was a
general statement of policy.300 This, in turn, prompted the court to analyze
the interim rule under the agency binding test rather than the create new rights
or duties test.301 Thus, instead of asking, as the Second Circuit did, whether
the interim rule bound the public, the Fourth Circuit asked whether the rule
bound the agency.302
The court explained that “[a] rule is a general statement of policy if it does
not establish a binding norm and leaves agency officials free to exercise their
discretion.”303 It held that because the agency could still reach different
results, the interim rule did not bind the agency and was exempt from the
APA’s notice-and-comment procedures.304 As the conflicting results and the
statistical analysis indicate, reliance on the create new rights or duties test
can meaningfully affect a court’s inquiry.
But the test’s influence should not be overstated. Less than an overly strict
application of the test305 often leads to a finding that an agency acted properly
even when it shifted the regulatory landscape.306 Moreover, it is doubtful
whether, in light of Perez, the Second Circuit would have reached a similar
result today. Accordingly, the create new rights or duties test’s continued
dominance is somewhat in doubt.
f. Substantial Impact
The substantial impact test is statistically significant in the simple model
but not in the control model, which includes control variables for time periods
and circuit courts. The lack of significance in the control model is perhaps
explained by the test’s dominance in the Fifth Circuit, and its greater regard
prior to the Supreme Court’s Vermont Yankee decision in 1978, which
established that courts may not add procedural restrictions not contemplated
by Congress in the APA.307 While circuits gradually rejected the test

298. 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995).
299. Id. at 1335.
300. Id. at 1341.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., A.D. Transp. Express, Inc. v. United States, 290 F.3d 761, 768 (6th Cir.
2002).
306. See, e.g., Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 680 (6th Cir.
2005).
307. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524
(1978).
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entirely308 or in part,309 the Fifth Circuit continued to apply it.310 And
because that circuit has a higher rate of finding that a rule is legislative
overall, it is likely that controlling for the circuit reduces the significance of
the test’s explanatory power.
Still, Table 7 indicates that a court employing the substantial impact test
increases the likelihood of it finding that a rule is legislative by 16 percent.
This result supports the notion, or concern, that weighing whether an agency
action has a substantial impact on the regulated public would more often than
not demonstrate that an action has a substantial impact.
But it is noteworthy that despite these explanatory pitfalls, the substantial
impact test is less determinative of a court’s resolution of a notice-andcomment exemption challenge than the create new rights or duties test.311
This is surprising given the considerable number of scholars312 and courts313
who maintain that the substantial impact test would produce outcomes overly
burdensome to agencies.
5. Public-Focused Tests vs. Agency-Focused Tests
Lastly, the empirical analysis tests the hypothesis that relying on publicfocused tests increases the likelihood of a court finding that a rule is
legislative. To review, the agency-focused tests include: agency label,
clarification, pursuant to statutory delegation, and agency binding. The
public-focused tests are the create new rights or duties and substantial impact
tests. In both regression models, the two categories are statistically
significant.
Table 9: Agency-Focused vs. Public-Focused Analysis (N = 241)
Tests

Agency-Focused
Public-Focused

Held Legislative
Under Simple Model
-.23*** (.09)
.27*** (.07)

Held Legislative
Under Control Model
-.24*** (.06)
.27*** (.07)

Under the control model, using agency-focused tests reduces the
likelihood of finding that a rule is legislative by 24 percent, while publicfocused tests increase that likelihood by 27 percent. These results support
the initial hypothesis and are also compatible with the findings of the create
new rights or duties and clarification tests in particular.
308. See supra notes 167–78.
309. See Caribbean Produce Exch., Inc. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 893 F.2d 3, 8
(1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 182 (1st Cir. 1983)).
310. See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text; see also Shell Offshore Inc. v.
Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 630 (5th Cir. 2001); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 616,
620 (5th Cir. 1994), modified on denial of reh’g en banc, No. 93-1377, 1994 WL 484506 (5th
Cir. Sept. 7, 1994).
311. See supra Part II.B.2.
312. Levin, supra note 3, at 289–90.
313. See supra notes 167–78.
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The difference between the two modes of analysis, focusing on the agency
or focusing on the public, captures a fundamental debate in administrative
law: What is the proper balance between burdening agencies with procedural
rules on the one hand, and usurping public participation from the process on
the other?314 Another way to frame this question is to ask how much burden
the public should endure in exchange for efficient and effective agency work?
The results in Table 9 appear to suggest that the answers to these questions
are reflected in judges’ determinations of whether a rule is legislative or
nonlegislative.
III. REFINING THE IMPERFECT TEST
Administrative law scholars have articulated several proposals for the
proper test.315 In the 1990s, some scholars tended to endorse one of the six
tests used by courts or to offer a refinement to one of those tests.316 Other
scholars, however, have ventured to suggest more novel approaches, such as
dismissing this inquiry entirely and allowing an agency to promulgate
nonlegislative rules when it labels them as such.317
This Note prefers a more conservative approach: using a combined publicfocused and agency-focused test. Specifically, using the clarification test and
create new rights or duties test together will help elucidate the agency’s
intent, the rule’s impact, and consequently its proper classification. These
recommendations are informed by this Note’s qualitative and empirical
analyses. As the qualitative portion demonstrated, the clarification test and
create new rights or duties test each offer a powerful analytical framework.318
Further, the empirical analysis demonstrates not only that these tests are
the most widely used tools but also that they meaningfully increase or
decrease a court’s likelihood of finding that a rule is legislative or
nonlegislative.319 A balanced approach, then, could help to arrive at the most
neutral test.
Accordingly, this Note endorses the use of both the clarification and create
new rights or duties tests by courts. To resolve further ambiguity, this Note
also calls for a narrow substantial impact test. Finally, this Note suggests
that the agency label test be removed from the analysis entirely.
A. Balancing Agency-Focused and Public-Focused Tests
As Part II.B.5 indicates, adopting either the agency-focused or publicfocused approach contributes to the result the court reaches in differentiating
314. See Asimow, supra note 41, at 533–34.
315. See Franklin, supra note 2, at 286–86 (analyzing some of the proposed tests or
modifications to existing approaches).
316. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 2, at 559–61.
317. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 205, at 1490. Elliott frames his suggestion as rooted in
“a fundamental tenet of administrative law, crucial to maintaining the proper balance between
courts and agencies, that an agency’s action is what it says it is.” Id.
318. See supra Parts II.B.4.b, II.B.4.e.
319. Supra Part II.B.4.
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legislative from nonlegislative rules.320 The case law and literature
highlighted throughout this Note provide several reasons for this result.321
But in short, and on an abstract level, an agency-focused analysis highlights
the challenges of administrative rulemaking procedures,322 and a publicfocused analysis places great weight on the adverse impact a regulation has
on the public.323 From these different approaches, courts seem to draw
different conclusions.
But to reach a result that best captures the principles of the APA,324 courts
should adopt elements of both. As one circuit aptly noted: “Inevitably, in
determining whether the APA requires notice and comment rulemaking, the
interests of agency efficiency and public input are in tension.”325
Accordingly, an analysis that overly emphasizes one of these interests would
more readily arrive at the conclusion that best supports one of these
considerations.
Adopting an analysis that includes elements of both public-focused and
agency-focused tests would not immunize a court from scrutiny around
injecting certain biases about the proper role and function of agencies into its
analysis of a particular dispute. But it would push, or at least lightly nudge,
the reviewing court to grapple with justifications from both categories and
employ a more equitable analysis. Though some scholars prefer to look
outside of the established realm of case law to fashion a proper test,326 it is
possible to improve the current approach within the established tests. The
following sections suggest which modifications should be introduced.
B. Balancing the Create New Rights or Duties and Clarification Tests
The create new rights or duties test and clarification test complement and
inform each other. An agency action may clarify a regulation, create new
rights or duties, or accomplish both. Employing these tests assists courts by
demonstrating both the agency’s intended effect and the actual impact an
action has on the public. This, in turn, provides the court with a greater
understanding of the rule’s proper classification under the APA. A Sixth
320. Supra Part II.B.4.
321. Supra Parts I.B, II.B.3.
322. See, e.g., Friedrich v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 894 F.2d 829, 836 (6th Cir.
1990) (“The Secretary’s role is . . . to apply the statutory standard to an enormous number of
modern medical practices.”).
323. Compare Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613–14 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[P]enalizing the
agency for explaining what was for the plaintiffs the bad news . . . would be like killing the
messenger.”), with Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 171 (7th Cir. 1996) (“There
are thousands of animal dealers, and some unknown fraction of these face the prospect of
having to tear down their existing fences . . . . The concerns of these dealers are
legitimate . . . .”).
324. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950); see also Posner, supra
note 45, at 953–54 (describing the APA as a compromise between competing views on the
function of administrative agencies).
325. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir. 1984).
326. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1720–
21 (2007); Manning, supra note 74, at 929.
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Circuit case, Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice,327
illustrates some of the merits of this proposition.
In Dismas Charities, an operator of private detention centers challenged a
DOJ amendment to its previous regulations as a legislative rule.328
Specifically, the case concerned the Imprisonment of a Convicted Person
Act.329 The provision giving rise to the dispute stated that the DOJ could
place prisoners in any facility that met the DOJ’s “minimum standards.”330
In 1992, the DOJ determined that private facilities met these standards and,
accordingly, allowed certain classes of prisoners to be placed in them.331 But
a decade later, the DOJ issued a memorandum that rendered imprisonment
of certain classes of prisoners in private facilities unlawful.332 This change,
the court agreed, had a severe impact on corporations such as the plaintiffs
in the case.333
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit held that the memorandum is a
paradigmatic example of an interpretive rule.334 It reasoned that the
memorandum interpreted the statute and, based on that interpretation,
concluded that the DOJ’s previous position was unlawful.335 The memo’s
impact notwithstanding, the court held that the DOJ acted properly and that
this action was exempt from notice and comment.336
While the court’s certainty that the rule was interpretive is perhaps
overstated, the holding is justified. It was within the DOJ’s power to
determine what it could lawfully do under the statute, and the court’s
conclusion that the agency did not need to undergo notice-and-comment
rulemaking was therefore reasonable. Public input, the court reasoned, is
neither necessary nor helpful to determine “what the law already is.”337 The
court was able to reach this conclusion by considering both the rule’s impact
on the public and the agency’s capacity to interpret a statute.
Compare this sensible reasoning to a district court that analyzed the same
memorandum but came to the opposite conclusion.338 The district court held
that the DOJ violated the APA because it did not afford affected parties an
opportunity to participate in the process.339 The court’s decision is curious
because it leaves agencies powerless to engage in proper and useful
interpretive actions. Instead, it significantly narrows an agency’s ability to
327. 401 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2005).
328. Id. at 675.
329. Id. at 670.
330. Id. (describing how, under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the Bureau of Prisons may place
prisoners in “any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of
health and habitability”).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 681.
334. Id. at 680.
335. Id.
336. See id. at 681–82.
337. Id. at 680.
338. Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 215 (D. Mass. 2003).
339. Id.
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issue the type of interpretive rules that the APA exempts from notice-andcomment procedures.
These two cases illustrate why considering both factors can be
illuminating. Since agency actions often both clarify a regulation and
establish new rights or duties, adopting both tests enables courts to strike the
balance between proper and efficient agency action on the one hand, and
impermissible actions that bind the public on the other.
C. Disposing of the Agency Label Test
The agency label test has some appeal, especially in its capacity to afford
a presumption of validity to agency operation.340 Nevertheless, this test’s
significant shortcomings necessitate its removal from a proper analysis.
Most worryingly, the logic of the agency label test is circular. Courts
considering it an indication of the disputed rule’s proper classification
effectively adopt the following position: The agency’s rule is nonlegislative
because the agency labeled it as nonlegislative. And the agency labeled it as
nonlegislative because the rule is nonlegislative.341
It is true that most courts analyze other tests and do not justify their
conclusions on this test alone.342 However, even those courts arguing that
the inquiry is a “starting point” introduce an ill-advised consideration into the
inquiry.343 Not only does it produce circular reasoning, it also places undue
emphasis on an element that is already embedded in the analysis. The
agency’s classification of the rule is well-known: the petitioner is
challenging it.
Finally, one key argument for the test is that it captures certain
presumptions of valid agency actions that permeate administrative law.344
Agencies, after all, have been delegated authority because of their expertise,
and it is therefore justified, if not necessary, to afford them this presumption.
But this rationale is best suited for instances in which courts are asked to
inquire whether an agency action is substantively reasonable. In the context
of the APA, and specifically in applying the exemptions from the notice-andcomment procedures, these presumptions are misguided.
First, courts, unlike agencies, are neutral arbiters in determining whether
an agency’s procedure was valid. Second, the APA—as manifested in its
text and legislative history—is undoubtedly concerned with procedural

340. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding that a rule was nonlegislative because it “was not published in either the Code of
Federal Regulations or the Federal Register, providing further evidence that the regulation was
not intended to be binding”).
342. Supra Part II.B.2.
343. See Mejia-Ruiz v. INS, 51 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Metro. Sch. Dist. v.
Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1992)).
344. Levin, supra note 3, at 290 (noting that the agency label test is rooted is an “outgrowth
of the presumption of procedural validity that courts ordinarily accord to administrative
action”).
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validity.345 Accordingly, when courts assess procedural validity they are
firmly within their expertise and congressional mandate. They do not wade
into the substantive territory that agencies dominate. The agency label test
is therefore better left to nonprocedural inquiries and should not inform the
analysis when distinguishing legislative from nonlegislative rules.
D. Narrowing the Substantial Impact Test
Courts who venture into the substantial impact analysis flirt with the
temptation to establish additional procedural requirements on agencies
beyond the scope of the APA.346 The Supreme Court has, on several
occasions, warned about such practices,347 and accordingly, courts have
gradually shifted away from the test.348 But this inquiry can be informative
and still remain within the confines of the APA.
A Second Circuit case, Time Warner Cable Inc. v. FCC,349 illustrates some
of the justifications of the substantial impact inquiry. Commensurate with
the rise in popularity of cable television, Congress and the FCC were
concerned that telecom companies were engaging in anticompetitive
practices.350 Specifically, regulators worried that cable operators, such as
Time Warner Cable, were taking “unfair advantage” of their market
dominance when negotiating with programming networks, such as CNN or
ESPN.351 As part of the effort to combat this practice, the FCC established
a regulatory regime under which programming networks could challenge
anticompetitive behavior by cable operators.352
In 2011, without notice and comment procedures, the FCC published a
“standstill rule,” which required that, in the case of a dispute between
programming networks and cable operators, the latter must continue to
broadcast content from the former until the FCC settles the dispute.353 Time
Warner sued, arguing that the rule is legislative, and the Second Circuit
agreed. The court explained that “all procedural rules affect substantive
rights to some extent.”354 Accordingly, the proper distinction between those
rules that are legislative and those that are exempt from notice and comment
is “one of degree depending upon whether the substantive effect is
sufficiently grave so that notice and comment are needed to safeguard the
345. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950).
346. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
524 (1978) (holding that courts may not add additional procedural requirements not already
outlined in the APA); see also La.-Pac. Corp. v. Block, 694 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1982)
(noting that using the substantial impact analysis possibly violates the Court’s holding in
Vermont Yankee).
347. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015).
348. See PARRILLO, supra note 21, at 11–12 (explaining that courts replaced the substantial
impact test with the binding effect test or the create new rights or duties test).
349. 729 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2013).
350. Id. at 143–45.
351. Id. at 146.
352. Id. at 143–48.
353. Id. at 150–51.
354. Id. at 168.
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policies underlying the APA.”355 Applying this rationale to the facts, the
court found that the rule was legislative because it “significantly affect[ed]
substantive rights.”356 This significant impact, the court concluded, is
precisely the effect which the APA sought to curb by allowing public
participation.357
As this case demonstrates, often an agency and petitioner both raise
concerns and justifications that are reasonable and can be aptly supported by
the existing tests. What the substantial impact test allows, then, is to
determine whether an agency action created the types of burdens the framers
of the APA sought to curb. The substantial impact test, used when other tests
fail to point to the proper classification, can thus be illuminating for courts.
CONCLUSION
A way forward in the pursuit of a proper demarcating line between
legislative and nonlegislative rules is to consider both the clarification and
create new rights or duties tests. This balanced public-focused and agencyfocused approach provides a test that is able to capture the procedural
concerns giving rise to the APA while also embracing agency reliance on
nonlegislative rules, even when these impact the public. In cases where this
distinction produces ambiguous results, the substantial impact test could
provide an informative analysis.
Scholars who propose that we do away with any of the six tests offer
persuasive reasoning. They rightly contend that the tests, in their various
formulations, do not answer the question of what rule’s “true” nature is. The
approach this Note offers does not resolve every question, and the test is
bound to remain imperfect. But a cohesive, balanced framework could,
without disregarding decades of precedent and experience, make this inquiry
more uniform, perceptive, and actionable for both courts and agencies.

355. Id. (quoting Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 5–6
(D.C. Cir. 2011)).
356. Id.
357. Id. at 169 (quoting Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 5).

